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Abstract and Keywords
The core aim of this paper is to articulate the essential features of an 
alternative compatibilist position, one that is responsive to sources of 
resistance to the compatibilist program based on considerations of fate 
and luck. The approach taken relies on distinguishing carefully between 
issues of skepticism and pessimism as they arise in this context. A 
compatibilism that is properly responsive to concerns about fate and 
luck is committed to what is described as free will pessimism, which is 
to be distinguished from free will skepticism. The conclusion reached is 
that critical compatibilism and free will pessimism should not be 
understood as providing a solution to the free will problem but rather 
as a basis for rejecting the assumptions and aspirations that lie behind 
it. This approach reveals not a (skeptical) problem waiting to be solved 
but a (troubling) human predicament that needs to be recognized and 
acknowledged.
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The will is as free as it needs to be. That does not mean, as 
libertarians would take it, that it is able to meet all the demands 
of the morality system … Nor does it mean that it is free enough 
to keep the morality system in adequate business, as reconcilers 
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usually take it to mean. It means that if we are considering merely 
our freedom as agents … we have quite enough of it to lead a 
significant ethical life in truthful understanding of what it 
involves.
Bernard Williams1
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The immediate aim of this paper is to articulate the essential features 
of an alternative compatibilist position, one that is responsive to 
sources of resistance to the compatibilist program based on 
considerations of fate and luck. The approach taken relies on 
distinguishing carefully between issues of skepticism and pessimism as 
they arise in this context. A compatibilism that is properly responsive to 
concerns about fate and luck is committed to what I describe as free 
will pessimism, which is to be distinguished from free will skepticism. 
Free will skepticism is the view that our vulnerability to conditions of 
fate and luck serves to discredit our view of ourselves as free and 
responsible agents. Free will pessimism rejects free will skepticism, 
since the basis of its pessimism rests with the assumption that we are
free and responsible agents who are, nevertheless, subject to fate and 
luck in this aspect of our lives. According to free will pessimism, all the 
major parties and positions in the free will debate, including that of 
skepticism, are modes of evasion and distortion regarding our human 
predicament in respect of agency and moral life.
The argument of this paper falls into three parts. In the first section it 
is argued that any plausible form of compatibilism must embrace and 
endorse free will pessimism. Compatibilism of this kind may be 
described as “critical compatibilism”, in order to contrast and 
distinguish it from the more orthodox forms of (optimistic and 
complacent) compatibilism. In the second section of the paper I offer an 
explanation of why it is that compatibilism has been so reluctant to 
embrace or accept critical compatibilism and the free will pessimism 
that it involves. The explanation provided turns largely on the role of 
what Bernard Williams has described as “the morality system” (as in 
the epigraph to this chapter), and its peculiar assumptions and 
aspirations. Finally, in the third and last section, I consider the general 
significance of these reflections and observations about critical 
compatibilism and free will pessimism and their implications for the 
free will problem itself. The conclusion I reach is that critical 
compatibilism and free will pessimism should not be understood as 
providing a solution to the free will problem but rather as a basis for 
rejecting the assumptions and aspirations that lie behind it—
assumptions and aspirations that have been shared by all the major 
parties involved in this debate. What we have, according to the stance 
of free will pessimism, is not a (skeptical) problem waiting to be solved 
but a (troubling) human predicament that needs to be recognized and 
acknowledged.
I. Metaphysical Attitudes and the Free Will Problem
(p.94) 
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Before turning to the argument for critical compatibilism and free will 
pessimism we need to consider the general structure of the free will 
problem and ask, in particular, what sort of “solution” are we looking 
for? On the face of it, the problem seems straightforward enough. We 
have an image of ourselves as active agents in the world who are, in 
some measure, in command and control of our own destinies and the 
trajectory of our lives. What we do and what we become is in some 
relevant way up to us and depends on our own deliberations and 
choices. It is on the basis of possessing powers and capacities of these 
general kinds that we take ourselves to be moral agents who may be 
held accountable for our conduct and character. Various skeptical 
challenges may be presented to undermine and discredit this self-
image. The sorts of considerations that have been advanced include 
reflections about God, foreknowledge, and pre-destination; science and 
its implications as they concern deterministic laws of nature; and so on. 
The solution to the free will problem under this broad canopy would be 
to defeat the skeptical challenge and provide us with some form of 
“vindication” or “affirmation” with respect to our self-image as free and 
responsible agents in the world.
Interpreted this way, the skeptical/non-skeptical divide neatly 
maps onto what may be described as our “metaphysical attitudes” of 
optimism and pessimism. Something clearly analogous to this divide 
goes on with respect to the issues of the existence of God and the 
immortality of the soul, where the skeptical challenge is also closely 
associated with pessimistic worries about the human condition.2
Viewed this way, these metaphysical concerns are not merely 
theoretical issues, the position that we take on such questions will 
shape our sense of the value and significance of human life itself. The 
issue of being disconcerted and disenchanted certainly looms before us 
under some forms of skeptical challenge. On this account, the 
relationship between our metaphysical attitudes and the parties 
involved in the free will dispute seems simple:
Skepticism ➞ Pessimism
Refutation of Skepticism ➞ Optimism
A particularly vivid example of this relationship is provided in the first 
chapter of Daniel Dennett’s Elbow Room, an influential compatibilist 
work that sets about the task of discrediting the “gloomleaders” of 
skepticism and to vindicate the “optimistic” conclusion that free will is 
not an illusion.3 On Dennett’s analysis, almost all the worries associated 
with the free will problem involve “bugbears and “bogeymen” that have 
been generated by misleading “intuition pumps” employed by 
(p.95) 
Free Will Pessimism
Page 5 of 35
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Lund 
University Libraries; date: 28 October 2017
philosophers in the Western tradition—producing a set of groundless 
anxieties that require some readily available philosophical therapy for 
their relief.
While libertarians and compatibilists, like Dennett, may disagree about 
how the skeptic can be defeated they are, nevertheless, agreed that this 
can be done and that this serves to secure a more optimistic view of 
human life.4 However, as with the parallel cases concerning God and 
the immortality of the soul, not all philosophers accept that free will 
skepticism implies any significant or severe form of pessimism. An 
alternative strategy, therefore, is to defeat pessimism without refuting 
skepticism.5 From this standpoint, an optimistic solution can found 
without following either the libertarian or compatibilist in their non-
skeptical commitments. Finally, the traditional skeptic may be 
unpersuaded by all these strategies and insist that not only can 
skepticism not be refuted, this remains a basis for pessimism about the 
human predicament, an outlook which is indeed disillusioning 
and troubling because it discredits our self-image as free and 
responsible beings.6 In general terms, this exhausts the various 
available views and strategies on free will as they relate to our 
metaphysical attitudes and their respective grounds. In what follows it 
will be argued that all the above positions and strategies are, in 
different ways, guilty of evasion about the real nature of the human 
predicament and seek a “solution to the free will problem” that 
precludes a truthful and accurate account of what our predicament 
involves. This argument will begin with an argument showing that a 
plausible compatibilism must take the form of critical compatibilism and 
endorse free will pessimism.
II. Compatibilism, Skepticism, and Pessimism
The best way to approach this issue is by way of considering Thomas 
Nagel’s seminal contribution concerning the problem of “moral luck”. 
Nagel’s account of the problem of moral luck provides us with an 
especially powerful and pertinent understanding of the skeptical 
challenge in this sphere. The core problem in Nagel’s discussion 
concerns the relationship between freedom and responsibility, where 
this is understood in terms of the relationship between control and 
moral evaluation. Intuitively, Nagel argues, people can only be 
reasonably held responsible or subject to moral evaluation for what 
they have control over. However, reflection on control suggests that 
“ultimately nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems 
to be under his control.”7 This observation, Nagel argues, “threatens to 
erode most of the moral assessments we find it natural to make.” We 
(p.96) 
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can categorize the various ways in which we find that control is eroded 
into the following four modes of moral luck.
(1) Constitutive luck concerns the kind of person that we are and 
what our moral character is like. This includes not only our 
dispositions of choice but also our inclinations, capacities, and 
temperament. To a considerable extent these matters of 
character and disposition do not depend on our own prior 
choices or decisions (i.e., for the most part we are not “self-
made-selves”).8
(2) Circumstantial luck concerns the kinds of situations 
and choices that we face or encounter and must respond to. 
Obviously there is considerable variation in the sorts of 
challenges and difficulties that we may be presented with. 
Again, we have limited control over such factors even though 
they crucially influence the way in which we will be subject to 
moral evaluation and what we will actually be held responsible 
for.
(3) Consequential luck concerns how our actions and choices 
actually turn out, which includes upshots and results that may 
be entirely unintended and unforeseen. Nevertheless, the 
specific ways in which our actions and choices play out may 
greatly influence how we are evaluated and, indeed, whether we 
are praised or blamed.
(4) Antecedent luck concerns the final retreat to the agent’s will 
as a potential source of pure, untainted control. Even here, 
however, we may still find that antecedent conditions influence 
the agent’s will and, hence, in the final analysis, the agent’s own 
will slips away from control and is vulnerable to external, alien 
factors.
When we consider all these various dimensions of moral luck and the 
limits of control we are in danger of arriving at the conclusion that, 
since nothing is properly and fully under the agent’s control, there are 
no suitable foundations for moral evaluation or moral responsibility.
It is a notable merit of Nagel’s analysis that he stops short of endorsing 
the skeptical conclusion. What he aims to do is to describe a problem 
that appears to be recalcitrant to any solution. Nagel is not so much 
concerned to generate a skeptical argument as to put his finger on the 
various but related ways in which all parties in the free will debate—
including the skeptic—may be judged guilty of evasion. (a) On the face 
of it, compatibilist accounts are especially vulnerable to Nagel’s 
analysis. Although compatibilists “leave room for ordinary conditions of 
responsibility”, they fail to “exclude the influence of a great deal that [a 
(p.97) 
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person] has not done”.9 That is to say, moral evaluations of conduct in 
these circumstances are impure or tainted because they leave scope for 
the influence of factors that the agent does not control (for example, in 
relation to her circumstances, constitution, and so on). (b) In contrast 
with compatibilism, libertarian accounts aim to secure a sharp, neat 
boundary between the active self, which decides what we do, and what 
is external and alien. But this (internal) self-image, Nagel argues, is 
eroded under reflection, whereby all that we are is consumed within 
the natural order of events—leading eventually to the disappearance of 
the active agent, who gets swallowed up in the causal flow of 
nature. (c) Finally, despite the apparent slide into skepticism, Nagel 
firmly resists any easy solution of this kind because it is, as he 
describes our experience, impossible for us to entirely abandon or 
jettison our “internal” sense of self as a responsible agent, or to refrain 
from our tendency to extend this view of ourselves to others.10
According to Nagel’s analysis, “solutions” in any of these directions fail 
to fully acknowledge that we are simultaneously pulled in two opposing 
directions that we cannot reconcile. The standard strategies that Nagel 
considers each try to collapse the problem by emphasizing one side of 
the dilemma rather than the other—but to do this is mere evasion 
rather than solution to the problem that we encounter.
One feature of Nagel’s analysis that deserves particular attention, and 
is especially relevant for understanding the approach taken by critical 
compatibilism, is what he takes to be the core requirement for any 
adequate attempt to preserve free and responsible agency. What is 
crucial, of this account, is that the active self—the free, responsible 
agent—must be insulated from the influence of fate and luck. Although 
Kantians and libertarians understand this general requirement in more 
specific terms relating to securing some form of sourcehood or ultimate 
agency this is, nevertheless, a requirement that all parties in the free 
will debate accept under some interpretation. It is, moreover, a key 
assumption that that does much to shape the entire “free will problem” 
and the debate that surrounds it. If this general requirement cannot be 
met, it is agreed by all parties, then our self-image as free, responsible 
agents will be compromised and will collapse.
The general requirement described above plays a key role in the core 
incompatibilist argument against all compatibilist strategies and 
proposals. Let us call this incompatibilist argument the Basic Exclusion 
Argument (BEA):
(p.98) 
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1. There is a set of conditions φ (under some contested interpretation) 
such that an agent is free and responsible for an action or set of actions 
when these conditions are satisfied.
2. There is another set of conditions β (under some contested 
interpretation) such that an agent’s action or set of actions are subject 
to fate and luck when those conditions are satisfied.
*3. Any action (or set of actions) that satisfy φ cannot be such that it 
also satisfies β. That is to say, if an action X satisfies φ it cannot also be 
subject to β. <Exclusion Premise (EP)>.
4. Any and all compatibilist interpretations of φ are such that they may 
be satisfied and still be subject to β (i.e., compatibilist conditions φ* do 
not support or satisfy EP#3 above).
5. It follows that we must reject any and all compatibilist 
interpretations φ*, as they are inadequate as judged by a standard that 
compatibilists do not and cannot reject (EP).
Libertarians believe that their own interpretations of conditions φ can 
satisfy EP and avoid the skeptical conclusion (although this requires the 
truth of indeterminism). Skeptics maintain that there is no available set 
of conditions φ that serve to satisfy EP and, hence, the skeptical 
conclusion goes through either way. In what follows I want to focus on 
the compatibilist response to BEA and the stance compatibilists take 
with respect to EP.
Proponents of BEA are entirely justified in claiming that compatibilists 
have consistently adhered to EP and aimed to satisfy it. What 
compatibilists have denied is premise #4, the claim that compatibilism 
fails to satisfy the standard set by EP (premise #3). Let us consider the 
classical compatibilist argument that is launched against premise #4, 
an argument aiming to show that agents who satisfy suitably 
interpreted compatibilist conditions (φ*) are not subject to fate and luck 
(i.e., conditions β). The core feature of this argument is that the 
incompatibilist claim (premise #4) relies on a basic confusion between 
fatalism and determinism. More specifically, it is argued that if we 
properly interpret conditions β (i.e., β*) then premise #4 is groundless. 
Fatalism is the doctrine that all our deliberations and actions are 
causally ineffective and make no difference to the course of events. 
Nothing about the thesis of determinism implies that this is the 
universal condition. Dennett provides a particularly vivid example of 
this contrast:
(p.99) 
Free Will Pessimism
Page 9 of 35
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Lund 
University Libraries; date: 28 October 2017
Consider the man who has thrown himself off the Golden Gate 
Bridge and who thinks to himself as he plummets, “I wonder if 
this is really such a good idea.” Deliberation has indeed become 
impotent for this man …11
While conditions of “local fatalism” of this sort may occur, and 
deliberation and action may sometimes be futile, circumstances of this 
kind are “abnormal” in a deterministic world, where deliberation is 
generally effective. Let us call this “contributory fatalism”, where this is 
understood to involve the causal impotence of the agent with respect to 
some outcome or upshot.
The critical compatibilism response to this line of argument, which aims 
at defending compatibilism and defeating BEA, tracks incompatibilist 
concerns. More specifically, the critical compatibilist agrees with the 
incompatibilist that appealing to the distinction between determinism 
and contributory fatalism is a shallow and evasive understanding of 
incompatibilist concerns. The relevant issue is not about the causal 
influence of the agent but rather the causal influences on the agent. On 
the assumption of determinism, however complex the 
mechanisms or capacities involved, the ultimate source or origin of 
conduct and character is external to the agent and not within the 
agent’s control or influence. Fatalistic concerns of this kind, which we 
may term “origination fatalism”, cannot simply be set aside or ignored 
on the basis of considerations relating to contributory fatalism.
What these observations reveal is that, within the structure of 
compatibilist commitments, whatever specific form they may take, we 
inevitably encounter limits to control and the way it is actually 
exercised and occasioned. Neither second-order (hierarchical) 
capacities nor reason-responsive abilities will enable us to evade this 
implication.12 What this reveals is the fact of our finitude and 
contingencies—these being circumstances under which all human 
agents inescapably must operate. While libertarians may aspire to 
escape limitations of this kind (for example, by postulating 
“unconditioned conditions”, “contra-causal freedom”, or similarly 
motivated forms of metaphysical apparatus of this general kind), 
compatibilists reject all such aspirations as illusory. Having said this, 
compatibilists are in no position to refuse to acknowledge the force of 
fatalistic concern with respect to origination issues.13 It is at this 
juncture where critical compatibilists diverge from their complacent 
(optimistic) compatibilist brethren. At the same time, critical 
compatibilists also diverge from incompatibilists—libertarians and 
skeptics alike—in rejecting the view that considerations of this kind, 
relating to origination and the limits of control, license skepticism 
(p.100) 
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about freedom and moral responsibility. The capacities described by 
compatibilists (i.e., as identified by φ*—reason-responsiveness, etc.,) 
are, they maintain, robust and substantial enough to serve as a secure 
foundation for our attitudes and practices associated with moral 
responsibility.
At this point, the incompatibilist is sure to raise the following objection. 
While critical compatibilists are correct in acknowledging the force of 
fatalistic concern relating to origination and the limits of control, as 
generated on compatibilist models, the attempt to separate issues of 
fate and responsibility in the manner proposed cannot be acceptable. 
More specifically, for reasons highlighted in Nagel’s discussion, the 
presence of conditions of origination fate bring with them worries 
about moral luck; that is, worries relating to agents being subject to 
moral evaluation in ways that are sensitive to factors that they do not 
control. This remains the core incompatibilist objection to the 
compatibilist project and concessions about fate do not address or 
settle this difference. Granted that it is intuitively unjust to hold agents 
responsible for aspects of their conduct and character that they do not 
control (as per the exclusion thesis), conditions of freedom and 
responsibility cannot be sustained in circumstances where an agent is 
subject to fate and luck along the lines described. From this 
perspective, fate and luck come together, and where such conditions 
hold, free and responsible agency is eroded into nothing.
The usual compatibilist reply to this, as found prominently in Dennett’s 
Elbow Room, is to try and deflate the luck objection. It is Dennett’s 
basic contention, consistent with much contemporary compatibilist 
thinking, that human agents are “not just lucky”, we are “skilled self-
controllers”—this being a theme to which Dennett devotes much of his 
book.14 Once again, this general line of reply seems not to engage with 
the real force or basis of incompatibilist concern. Incompatibilists 
recognize, of course, that compatibilist accounts of self-control and 
reason-responsiveness do not leave us “merely lucky” or unskilled, 
unable to enhance our abilities and talents. The point is, rather, that the 
specific capacities we may have, the way we actually exercise them, 
and the occasions we are provided for employing them, all depend, 
given deterministic assumptions, on external factors and conditions 
that no agent ultimately has control over. In other words, from an 
incompatibilist point of view, even on the most generous and robust 
interpretation of compatibilist powers of rational self-control, we still 
face limits of control over: (1) the acquisition of the relevant capacities 
involved; (2) the way these capacities are actually exercised in given 
circumstances; and (3) the occasions in which these capacities must be 
(p.101) 
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employed or exercised (i.e., the sorts of moral challenges we may face 
or be presented with). In all these cases, what we do and will be held 
accountable for depends on these external or alien factors. From this 
perspective, moral life becomes hopelessly vulnerable to luck or the 
limits of control, which is not permitted by the exclusion thesis and is 
unacceptable to all those who endorse it. Interpreted this way, the 
incompatibilist assessment of critical compatibilism is that it is an 
inherently unstable effort to respond to incompatibilist concerns about 
fate and luck, since any effort to acknowledge and accommodate those 
concerns, along the lines proposed, must discredit the compatibilist 
component of its commitments. More specifically, the attempt made by 
critical compatibilists to acknowledge and accommodate these 
concerns relating to fate and luck plainly violate EP (premise #3), 
which has hitherto been accepted by all parties in the debate.
It should be evident that, whatever the merits of the incompatibilist 
rejoinder described above, the critical compatibilist reply to BEA is very 
different to that pursued by orthodox compatibilism. Critical 
compatibilists accept premise #4—they agree that compatibilist 
conditions φ* may be fully satisfied and the agent or actions concerned 
still subject to relevant forms of fatalism and luck. Critical 
compatibilists deny, nevertheless, the skeptical conclusion because they 
deny EP or premise #3 (contrary to their orthodox brethren). It is the 
burden of the argument, so far, that a sensible, credible compatibilism 
is constrained by the nature and character of its own commitments to 
take the form of critical compatibilism and thus must deny EP. Failing 
this, compatibilism is plainly guilty of evasion and superficiality on the 
matters of fate and luck, just as its incompatibilist critics have 
suggested.
Clearly, then, the point that needs emphasis for our present purposes, 
is that any plausible form of compatibilism must recognize and 
acknowledge the influence of fate and luck on the manner and context 
in which our capacities of rational self-control operate. In consequence 
of this, it must reject the EP and allow that conditions of free and 
responsible agency may coincide with the presence of conditions of fate 
and luck, understood in terms of external factors beyond our control 
that directly influence how our capacity of self-control is actually 
exercised. Nagel describes circumstances of this kind in these terms:
A person can be morally responsible only for what he does: but 
what he does results from a great deal that he does not do; 
(p.102) 
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therefore, he is not morally responsible for what he is and is not 
morally responsible for.15
For Nagel, embracing this outlook would leave us “morally at the mercy 
of fate” and so must be rejected. My argument, so far, has been that 
this is exactly what any plausible compatibilism must commit us to, 
consistent with agents possessing and exercising (robust) capacities for 
rational self-control.
There is another important feature of critical compatibilism that flows 
from the rejection of EP that needs further, independent articulation, 
and description. This feature concerns the metaphysical attitudes that 
this stance naturally licenses or occasions. In circumstances where EP 
is not satisfied, we have (deep) reasons for being “troubled” or 
“disconcerted” by our predicament as this relates to human ethical life 
and moral agency. Even if we are “fortunate” in the particular ethical 
trajectory our lives may take, there is no basis (as incompatibilists 
rightly insist) for an easy optimism when fate and luck intrude into our 
ethical lives and the way we may exercise our moral agency. These 
observations and reflections may and should occasion a sense of 
“disenchantment” about our predicament, and to this extent this will 
license and occasion a significant sense of pessimism (on analogy with 
related metaphysical issues and the attitudes that they may occasion). 
However, the crucial point in relation to critical compatibilism, 
is that a pessimism of this nature is not rooted or grounded in 
skepticism about free will and moral responsibility. On the contrary, it 
presupposes that we reject any skepticism of this kind, since the form of 
pessimism that is occasioned depends on viewing ourselves and others 
as agents who are free and responsible but, nevertheless, subject to 
fate and luck in the exercise and operation of our moral capacities. Let 
us call this stance or metaphysical attitude free will pessimism. I will 
return in the next section of this paper to say more about the nature 
and grounds of free will pessimism. For now, however, suffice it to note 
that even if we reject compatibilism (for example, because we retain a 
commitment to EP, as incompatibilists certainly will do) it is still crucial 
to recognize the significance of these findings both as they relate to 
critical compatibilism and the free will pessimism that flows from it.
(p.103) 
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III. Compatibilism and “The Morality System”
The question I now want to turn to is why have compatibilists been so 
reluctant to embrace critical compatibilism and free will pessimism? 
Incompatibilists maintain that compatibilists conditions φ* are such 
that they do not exclude conditions β. Whereas orthodox compatibilists 
attempt to refute this premise (#4) critical compatibilists maintain that 
compatibilists should accept or recognize the truth of premise #4 and 
should instead reject EP (#3). What is it about EP that orthodox 
compatibilists find so difficult to abandon? There are, I suggest, two 
considerations that run deep in orthodox compatibilist thinking that 
account for this resistance to jettisoning EP. The first concerns the 
relation between the exclusion thesis and “the morality system” and the 
second, related to the first, concerns the question of optimism.
Free Will Pessimism
Page 14 of 35
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Lund 
University Libraries; date: 28 October 2017
(1) The exclusion thesis may be understood as an essential 
feature of what Bernard Williams calls “the morality system”.16
The morality system, as Williams describes it, places particularly 
heavy emphasis on the (peculiar) concept of obligation, along 
with the closely concepts of blame and voluntariness. Moral 
responsibility”, as “the morality system” understands it, is taken 
to be primarily a matter of rational agents voluntarily violating 
their obligations and, thereby, being liable to blame and 
retribution. A further closely related feature of the morality 
system is that insists that moral responsibility, interpreted in 
these (narrow) terms, must somehow be capable of 
“transcending luck”, providing a purity that only genuine 
(rational) agency of some kind makes possible.17 Within this 
framework, the aspirations of libertarianism and its commitment 
to EP is entirely intelligible. Although orthodox compatibilists 
resist the aspirations of libertarians, and its efforts to secure 
some form of absolute or ultimate agency, they remain 
committed to the particular conception of responsibility 
encouraged by the morality system and believe that it can be 
satisfied within compatibilist constraints.18 In contrast with this, 
critical compatibilism involves rejecting core features of “the 
morality system”, including its particular conception of moral 
responsibility (all this being something, if Williams is right, that 
we have good reason to do in any case). Although abandoning 
EP certainly makes it impossible to salvage the particular 
conception of freedom and responsibility promoted by the 
morality system, this is not to be confused with skepticism about 
freedom and responsibility tout court. On the contrary, while 
proponents of the morality system tend to present the situation 
this way, it is generally recognized, even by the proponents of 
the morality system themselves, that the narrow conception of 
moral responsibility constructed around the assumptions of the 
morality system is one that is both “local” (modern, Western) 
and is widely contested—including within our own modern, 
Western ethical community.19
(p.104) 
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(2) There is, as already mentioned, another consideration, 
closely related to the first, that is also very significant in this 
context. The aspiration to optimism, in particular to tell a 
comforting story about the human predicament in respect of 
moral agency, is one that runs deep in the morality system. This 
deep resistance to a disturbing or troubling view of human 
ethical life, one where the excise and operation of our moral and 
rational capacities depends in large measure on factors that are 
not controlled or governed by those same capacities and powers, 
is one that is not only shared by libertarians and compatibilists 
but that also motivates the skeptics. All of these parties, in their 
various ways, hold on to EP and the form of optimism that it 
insists on (i.e., that human ethical life does not function or 
operate in violation of the constraints that EP imposes upon it). 
Put in other terms, the form of optimism that EP insists on is one 
that rejects the very possibility of free will pessimism, much less 
accepts it as the truth about our human predicament. It is within 
this philosophical fabric, as encouraged by the forms of 
theorizing associated with the morality system, that (orthodox) 
compatibilist resistance to abandoning EP should be understood 
and appreciated. Clearly if we allow that free and responsible 
action may nevertheless be infused with conditions of fate and 
luck, we must also abandon any form of unqualified optimism—
in particular, the hyper-optimism that compatibilists such as 
Dennett endeavor to project.20
Critical compatibilism endorses no form of easy, complacent, or 
unmixed optimism on this subject. On the contrary, in giving weight to 
the limits of control, and circumstances of finitude and contingency in 
the sphere of human agency, critical compatibilism suggests a 
particular understanding of pessimistic concern—namely “free will 
pessimism” (as opposed to skepticism about freedom and 
responsibility). We might describe this stance as one as that recognizes 
or acknowledges that conditions of freedom and responsibility do not 
elude those of fate and luck but rather confront fate and luck and that 
these conditions are, indeed, meshed and entangled together. All 
theories and interpretations that deny this are, from this perspective, 
guilty of various modes of evasion that involve some effort of one kind 
or another to satisfy EP and the forms of optimism associated with it. 
This particular aspiration is something that critical compatibilists 
maintain we must abandon, not only because it generates insoluble 
philosophical perplexities but, more importantly, because it 
(p.105) 
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misrepresents the (difficult and troubling) truth about our 
circumstances as human agents.
One way to resist free will pessimism is to reject the suggestion that if 
we abandon EP then some form of pessimism must follows from this. 
Perhaps, critics may argue, no relevant metaphysical attitude of this 
(negative) kind needs to be generated by reflections of this nature. With 
respect to this matter a few general observations about the nature of 
the pessimism involved in free will pessimism are called for. (a) We can, 
as we have done, distinguish critical compatibilism from its orthodox 
counterpart simply with reference to the disagreement about EP (and 
how to respond to BEA). To this extent it may be argued that no specific 
affective or attitudinal element is essential to the core distinction 
between these two compatibilist stances as presented. (b) Moreover, we 
may also concede that whatever pessimistic features may naturally 
accompany the rejection of EP and the associated apparatus of the 
morality system, there is still much to welcome about this shift away 
from these commitments and aspirations (for example, we are better off 
without pernicious and destructive forms of retributivism that 
are grounded in these views).21 For this reason critical compatibilism 
may involve elements of both optimism and pessimism. There is no 
reason to suppose that the relevant metaphysical response here must 
be unmixed or uniform in nature—a finding that should not surprise us 
since the same is obviously true with respect to other, similar 
metaphysical issues and reflections (for example, concerning the 
existence of God, immortality, and so on). (c) The degree of pessimistic 
affect may vary depending on both our historical and cultural 
circumstances. For those who find themselves deep inside the morality 
system and its assumptions and aspirations, the sense of being troubled 
and disturbed by the thought of abandoning EP may well be amplified 
in proportion to the depth of their existing set of commitments. We may 
allow, therefore, that the sense of pessimism is likely to recede or 
dissipate over time as we (moderns, Westerners) withdraw from the 
morality system. All these concessions are consistent with the claim 
that critical compatibilism still licenses a distinct form of pessimism.
We may be pressed further here and asked to say more about the 
character of free will pessimism and how it relates to the critical 
compatibilism and the rejection of EP. In describing any form of 
pessimism we need to make reference to two central features: the 
grounds or basis of the pessimism and the quality or affective aspects 
that this may involve or imply. We have already been careful to 
emphasize that the grounds of free will pessimism presuppose that 
skepticism about freedom and moral responsibility is mistaken. Plainly 
(p.106) 
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the particular source of pessimism must be traced back to the view that 
free and responsible agents are, nevertheless, subject to significant 
forms of fate and luck (contrary to the requirements of EP). In general, 
pessimism is called forth or occasioned when something that we value 
is threatened or discredited. In this case, the significant feature of our 
condition that is discredited and undermined concerns our (deep) 
assumption and hope that there is some sort of “harmony” between our 
ethical life and the order of the world.22 It is, of course, a central theme 
of Williams’ work to argue that the ancient Greeks, unlike we (Western) 
moderns, had no such expectations about the world and how it is 
related to human ethical life. The important point here is that the move 
away from the morality system is not cost-free—whatever gains and 
advantages it may involve in other respects (including that of 
truthfulness).
Some similar and related observations are also in order with respect to 
the quality or affective aspect of free will pessimism. Pessimism may 
take various affective forms and degrees, ranging from intense 
despair and grief to a milder sense of being disconcerted or 
disenchanted with the state of things. Consider, for example, Pascal’s 
attitude to the supposition that there was no future state, which took 
the form of an extreme and severe pessimism that we may describe as 
excessive and immoderate. At the same time, we may also regard the 
Epicurean response of complete equanimity in face of death as being 
too shallow and lacking appropriate sensitivity to features of human life 
that should be recognized as troubling and difficult. It is within a matrix 
of this general kind that we should understand the stance of the free 
will pessimist. The response that is brought forth on the basis of 
reflections about our predicament as free and responsible agents who 
are, nevertheless, subject to conditions of fate and luck in the very 
exercise of our agency, is one that falls between the extreme of 
Pascalian despair and Epicurean calm and complacency. The right 
response, one that is duly sensitive to the features of our predicament, 
is that of a moderate but engaged sense of being disenchanted or 
disconcerted. Orthodox compatibilism is in this sense not only 
philosophically evasive with respect to the issues that it confronts, the 
philosophical evasions manifest themselves in forms of affective 
shallowness or superficiality—a failure to care about (problematic) 
features of our predicament that are or should be significant to us.
It is arguable that the preceding analysis of the source and nature of 
orthodox compatibilist resistance to critical compatibilism and free will 
pessimism still fails to identify the core concern. More specifically, it 
may be argued that orthodox compatibilist resistance to critical 
(p.107) 
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compatibilism stands at no great distance from incompatibilist 
resistance to compatibilism in general. The relevant issue here has to 
do with EP and the force of BEA itself. Orthodox compatibilists reject 
BEA because they reject the claim that compatibilist conditions may be 
satisfied when EP is violated (i.e., they deny premise #4). Their 
unwillingness to reject EP is rooted in the concern that if EP is not 
satisfied, or at least respected, then morality itself would be unfair. It 
would be unfair to endorse and apply conditions of freedom and 
responsibility that leave agents vulnerable to fate and luck. The thought 
here is one that supports much of Nagel’s entire analysis of the 
problem of moral luck and the associated fabric of the free will 
problem. If fate and luck are infused into the very exercise and 
operation of our moral capacities as agents then all moral evaluation is 
tainted and impure. Morality, as it were, requires fairness all the way 
down—and that is what EP, it is claimed, secures for us.23
Clearly critical compatibilism rejects this view of things and the 
assumptions and aspirations that must accompany it (and which lead on 
to the intractable nature of the free will problem itself). For critical 
compatibilism, which holds that satisfying EP is not a necessary 
condition of sustaining human freedom and moral responsibility, the 
relevant standard of fairness of the attitudes and practices associated 
with moral responsibility are provided and adequately secured by the 
satisfaction of the set of compatibilist conditions identified by φ*. The 
issue of fairness is internal to that fabric, which is itself liable to be 
modified, amended, and corrected over time.24 Any demand for fairness 
beyond this—some mode of absolute fairness—is liable to simply 
collapse under its own weight and results, ironically, in skepticism. 
This, at least, is where critical compatibilists (must) stand on this issue. 
Insisting on these observations, as they relate to human ethical life, is 
not, however, one that secures or encourages any simple, unmixed form 
of optimism. On the contrary, when we consider the various possible 
ethical trajectories human lives may take—especially those that are 
ethically unfortunate and problematic—we are confronted with an 
awareness of our ethical fragility and vulnerability, consistent with 
conceiving of ourselves as free, responsible ethical agents.25 The very 
fact that we are and should be troubled by reflections of this kind is 
evidence that there is something deeply wrong with the assumptions of 
the morality system and with EP in particular. It is only on the basis of 
an understanding and appreciation of (the possibility of) free will 
pessimism that we can make any adequate sense of our response to 
these cases and the particular way in which we find them disturbing 
(i.e., that we recognize that agents are both free and responsible and 
subject to conditions of fate and luck, contrary to EP). Much of the 
(p.108) 
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resistance to critical compatibilism that comes from within 
compatibilism itself may be accounted for as rooted in the discomfort 
that is felt once we acknowledge that EP does not govern human ethical 
life. This is, no doubt, a hard truth about our ethical lives that many—
especially for those who occupy a position well inside the morality 
system—will find difficult to accept. Indeed, many will find free will 
pessimism to be harder to accept—and much more disturbing—than 
any form of free will skepticism, since skepticism, at least, provides the 
consolation of ensuring that free, responsible agents are not subject to 
fate and luck (as per EP). There is an important sense, 
therefore, in which free will pessimism may be found to be much more 
disturbing than any form of free will skepticism—and that is especially 
true, of course, for those who do not find skepticism disturbing in any 
case.
IV. Incompatibilist Evasions and Free Will Pessimism
(p.109) 
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It has been argued, so far, that a plausible compatibilism must take the 
form of critical compatibilism and embrace free will pessimism. It has 
also been argued that the best explanation for why compatibilists have 
hitherto been reluctant to accept (or even consider) this view is that 
compatibilists have generally remained committed to the assumptions 
and aspirations of the morality system, including EP, which is an 
essential feature of it. None of this, however, in itself, shows that we 
should accept critical compatibilism and acknowledge that free will 
pessimism is the truth about the human predicament as it concerns 
moral agency. On the contrary, incompatibilists may welcome the 
conclusions we have arrived at with respect to the implications of 
compatibilism. The reason for this is that incompatibilists will suppose 
that the argument advanced so far, concerning compatibilism and free 
will pessimism serves not so much as an effective defense of a (modified 
or refined) compatibilism as a reductio of the whole compatibilist 
project. An approach of this kind, the incompatibilist may say, is not so 
much a case of “biting the bullet” as of shooting oneself in the head. 
Since critical compatibilism concedes that compatibilism implies free 
will pessimism and necessarily violates EP, the correct conclusion to 
draw from all this is that we should reject compatibilism.
The argument that follows continues from where BEA, and the above 
line of criticism, leaves off: namely, with the claim that we must reject 
compatibilism because it fails the standard of EP. The right place to 
begin, therefore, is with the alternatives that incompatibilism offers us. 
From the perspective of critical compatibilism, however, none of the 
familiar incompatibilist strategies can survive critical scrutiny. They 
fail, in particular, the very standard of EP that incompatibilists appeal 
to in framing BEA and are no less guilty of their own distinct forms of 
evasion (i.e., no less guilty than orthodox compatibilism). For our 
present purposes, which is to identify and present the core structure of 
the critical compatibilist argument leading to the conclusion that we 
should reject EP and endorse free will pessimism, what is required is, 
first, a reminder of the relevant reasons for rejecting incompatibilism 
and the various modes of evasion that this may involve, and, second, an 
interpretation of the implications of this for our overall 
understanding of the free will problem itself. Having explained in 
general terms why the retreat back to incompatibilism is not a viable or 
credible option, we face a clear choice between EP (and the intractable 
free will problem that it generates) and free will pessimism. We have 
every reason, I claim, to opt for free will pessimism. I will call the 
complete argument, extending beyond BEA, The Extended Argument to 
Free Will Pessimism (FWPA).
(p.110) 
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The structure of this argument, following on from BEA and leading to 
the conclusion that we should reject EP and embrace free will 
pessimism, takes this form:
1.–5. [BEA (#1– #5)]
6. If not compatibilism (i.e., because it fails EP, as identified by BEA), 
then incompatibilism.
7. If incompatibilism, then either libertarianism or skepticism.
8. If libertarianism, then either (a) agent-causal or (b) event-causal 
libertarianism.
9. Both agent-causal and event-causal forms of libertarianism are guilty 
of evasion with respect to the issues raised by EP. The first appeals to 
unintelligible or incoherent forms of (“panicky”) metaphysics; and the 
second is vulnerable to modes of luck of the kind that are proscribed by 
EP.
10. Given that both compatibilism (BEA) and libertarianism fail (FWPA, 
#6–#9), skepticism must follow. Although skepticism does not aim to 
satisfy EP (in contrast with orthodox compatibilism and libertarianism), 
it still respects EP. Since EP cannot be satisfied—that is, there are no
conditions φ that satisfy EP—a skeptical conclusion must follow (one 
that is generally taken to license its own form of pessimism).
11. Skepticism is either (a) global or (b) local. Local skepticism targets 
modes of responsibility that are specifically encouraged by “the 
morality system” and that aim to satisfy EP. Global skepticism maintains 
that there are no credible accounts of conditions φ on the ground that 
any acceptable account of conditions φ must satisfy EP (i.e., local 
skepticism and global skepticism are identical).
12. Local forms of skepticism are not a threat to free will pessimism or 
critical compatibilism, since it also endorses local skepticism of this 
kind (i.e., accepts and acknowledges that EP cannot be satisfied). 
Global forms of skepticism are a threat to free will pessimism and 
critical compatibilism since they endorse the claim that any acceptable 
account of conditions φ must satisfy EP, which rules out the very 
possibility of free will pessimism.
13. Global skepticism involves “bad faith” and is itself a form of evasion 
with respect to (the possibility of) free will pessimism. More specifically,
global skepticism involves denying the significance of moral 
capacities and abilities that human beings evidently possess and 
(p.111) 
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exercise. Skeptics generally begin by advancing global claims and then 
retreat back to local skepticism, manifesting their own discomfort with 
the evasions of global skepticism.
14. When we apply EP, and aim to satisfy or simply respect its demands, 
we find that it generates a range of unacceptable and unconvincing 
forms of evasion.
15. The free will problem structured around BEA and EP is, as Nagel’s 
original analysis suggests, intractable. The root source of this impasse 
rests with “the morality system” and its commitment to EP, which 
denies the very possibility of free will pessimism (and thus critical 
compatibilism).
16. We are faced with a fundamental choice between EP and free will 
pessimism. In light of the preceding analysis, we have every reason to 
reject EP and embrace free will pessimism.
To show that FWPA is entirely sound we would need to defend each of 
the premises relating to the challenges facing incompatibilism (#8–
#13). As I have indicated, there is no reason, in the present context, to 
repeat and rehearse all the relevant arguments and considerations in 
this context. It will suffice to provide a general overview of the core 
concerns and objections that serve to justify and support the premises 
concerned. It is reasonably obvious that if we reject compatibilism 
because it fails EP then we must consider one or other of the 
incompatibilist alternatives, libertarianism or skepticism (as per #6 and 
#7). Let us begin with the problems facing libertarianism.26 The 
libertarian believes that there is some available account of conditions φ 
(i.e., conditions φ#) that satisfy the requirement of EP but that this 
depends on the falsity of determinism. In order to satisfy EP, with a 
view to overcoming the limits of control in a way that provides for 
genuine ultimacy (and “self-creation”), libertarianism in its classical 
form introduced what even its most prominent exponents have 
described as an “odd” set of metaphysical commitments.27 The 
constructive metaphysical foundations of this theory, beyond the 
requirement of indeterminism, rests with the suggestion that free and 
responsible agents have active powers “which some would attribute 
only to God: each of us, when we act, is a prime mover unmoved.”28
The theory involved here is that of agent-causation and it has been 
extensively and effectively criticized not only by compatibilists but also 
by some leading representatives of contemporary 
libertarianism. It is argued by Robert Kane, for example, that agent-
causation theories are incapable of being “reconciled with modern 
scientific views of human beings” and that they fail to provide any 
(p.112) 
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intelligible account of how genuine ultimacy is possible.29 For this 
reason, Kane and others have defended event-causal libertarianism, a 
metaphysically more modest or “softer” theory.30 What is crucial to 
event-causal theories is the suggestion that free action of the kind 
required for moral responsibility can be secured by a theory of agency 
that allows that actions may be caused by (plural) available reasons or 
motivations that, nevertheless, do not necessitate or determine their 
occurrence. Event-causal theories of this kind are, however, vulnerable 
to the “luck objection”—an objection rooted in the requirements of EP 
(as presented in BEA). The fundamental problem here, as pressed by 
other libertarians as well as by skeptics or hard incompatibilists, is that 
agents may satisfy event-causal conditions of the kind described and 
still be no more in control of their conduct than compatibilists agents. If 
this is the case then the condition described by event-causal theories 
fall short of the sort of (total) control that ultimacy or genuine 
sourcehood requires.31 Clearly, then, given that libertarianism is found 
wanting, this forces a further retreat back to skepticism.
The skeptic maintains that EP cannot be satisfied by any proposed set 
of conditions φ concerning freedom and responsibility. They all fail, in 
various ways, the standard imposed by EP and BEA. However, 
according to the skeptic, EP must still be respected, even if it cannot be 
satisfied. To this extent, skepticism is itself an expression or 
manifestation of “the morality system” and its core assumptions and 
aspirations. It expresses, as it were, both the disappointment that 
human agents fail the standard set by EP and the continued optimism 
that this standard, nevertheless, remains in place, even if human agents 
fail to live up to it. In order to support this stance, the skeptic must rely 
on the key claim that any conception of freedom and responsibility that 
does not satisfy EP cannot be the “true” or “genuine” conception that 
we are (or should be) concerned with. That is to say, the skeptical 
position rests on a narrow and restricted conception of (true) freedom 
and responsibility that satisfies the preferred requirements of the 
morality system and its commitment to EP. Any alternative account 
must, therefore, be judged “shallow” or “superficial,” such as 
we find in the case of “the economy of threats account.”32 From the 
perspective of critical compatibilism, the skeptical position is itself just 
another mode of evasion generated by the morality system, one that 
similarly seeks to rule out the very possibility of free will pessimism (as 
denied by any continued commitment to EP).
Critical compatibilists will certainly agree, with the skeptic, that the 
particular conception of freedom and responsibility that the morality 
system aims to secure should be rejected and discarded. What it denies, 
(p.113) 
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however, is that this licenses any unqualified form of global skepticism 
(i.e., as based on the general application of BEA to all proposed 
accounts of conditions φ). According to this view of things, we need to 
distinguish carefully between two distinct skeptical views; (a) a 
qualified or local skepticism as it concerns our Western, modern 
conception as encouraged by the morality system, and (b) an 
unqualified or global skepticism that extends to any and all proposed 
accounts of conditions φ. While it may be true that the narrower, local 
conception fails (for reasons pointed out by BEA), it does not follow 
from this that all proposed concepts must fail—unless, of course, we 
simply assume that EP holds or applies in respect of all understandings 
of freedom and responsibility. If this were the case, then local 
skepticism would directly lead to the global skeptical conclusion.
Critical compatibilists, as we have noted, are themselves committed to 
local skepticism as it has been interpreted above, a concession that is 
entirely consistent with their own compatibilist commitments (unlike 
orthodox compatibilists who aim to satisfy the demands of EP and the 
morality system from within their compatibilist commitments).33
Critical compatibilists can also accept that some proposed versions of 
compatibilist conditions φ*—such as “the economy of threats 
account”—are inadequate or insufficiently robust for the purpose of 
providing a substantial and credible theory of freedom and 
responsibility. None of this leaves them in the situation of having to 
accept an unqualified or global form of skepticism about freedom and 
responsibility, which is the only form of skepticism that is directly 
problematic for the critical compatibilist. The modes of freedom and 
responsibility grounded in the various robust, complex capacities 
identified and explained by (critical) compatibilism are more than 
adequate to the task of grounding and justifying attitudes and practices 
that are recognizably part of the fabric or moral and ethical life more 
broadly conceived (i.e., more broadly conceived than the morality 
system would suggest). Even skeptics generally concede this 
point and attempt to mask it by initially advancing strong global 
skeptical arguments and then retreating back to (the more modest and 
more plausible) qualified skeptical conclusion that is limited to the local 
conceptions of freedom and responsibility that are encouraged by the 
morality system.34
The general objection that critical compatibilism raises against (global) 
skepticism is that it is a form of “bad faith”. Compatibilist models of 
responsible agency, constructed along the lines of rational self-control 
and reason-responsiveness, while they may not satisfy EP, are plainly 
far more robust and sophisticated in accounting for a wide range of 
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distinctions and discriminations in this sphere than the economy of 
threats account. Any attempt to simply dismiss the powers and abilities 
described, and treat them as irrelevant to human ethical and social life, 
with no bearing on our reactive attitudes and retributive dispositions 
and practices, has more than a taint of “bad faith” about it. When we 
take this road, the humane goal of unmasking the distortions of the 
morality system and its preferred account of freedom and responsibility 
gets turned on its head and becomes the dehumanizing hypothesis that 
there are no real or genuine free and responsible agents in the world. 
Any skepticism of this unqualified kind must inevitably face the 
compelling objection that it constitutes just another mode of evasion, as 
encouraged by the morality system itself and its attachment to EP.35
Where do these critical reflections about the prospects of 
incompatibilism leave us? If we follow the argument leading from BEA 
and the rejection of compatibilism through to the difficulties facing the 
various forms of incompatibilism, we arrive back in the 
situation that Nagel diagnosed so forcefully in “Moral Luck”, which is 
the intractable nature of the free will problem. All the familiar 
approaches and strategies are, as Nagel suggests, guilty of evasion of 
one kind or another. Some attempt to solve the problem by proposing 
conditions φ that will satisfy EP by postulating extravagant and 
unintelligible metaphysical apparatus. Others seek to conceal or deny 
the ways in which their preferred theories remain vulnerable to 
concerns relating to fate and luck. Skeptics, the last representatives of 
the morality system, as it collapses under the weight of its own 
assumptions and aspirations, denies human freedom and moral 
responsibility altogether, rather than abandon its commitment to EP 
and the forms of optimism that it aims to secure. These modes of 
evasion are all encouraged by the morality system and the forms of 
theorizing that it generates. This leaves all those who accept EP, along 
with the free will problem constructed around it, trapped in a 
philosophical labyrinth that offers no way out.
According to critical compatibilism the insoluble nature of this 
philosophical conundrum serves as strong evidence that it is based on 
faulty assumptions and aspirations. The root source of this impasse 
rests with the morality system and its commitment to EP, which denies 
the very possibility of free will pessimism and critical compatibilism. We 
are, then, faced with a clear choice between EP and the morality 
system on one side, and free will pessimism and critical compatibilism 
on the other side. How do we decide between them? Faced with this 
choice between EP and free will pessimism we have every reason to opt 
for free will pessimism. One reason for this is that it allows us to set 
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aside the (intractable) free will problem and turn our attention, instead, 
to the distinct questions arising from the need to provide a credible 
account of conditions φ—unencumbered by the (faulty) requirements of 
EP. More importantly, however, the right basis for rejecting EP in favor 
of free will pessimism is that we find, on critical reflection, that free 
will pessimism is the most truthful account of our human predicament 
in respect of these matters. Unlike the forms of theorizing associated 
with the morality system, free will pessimism involves no evasions or 
metaphysical fabrications. It is free will pessimism, rather than the 
philosophical theories constructed around EP, that most accurately and 
adequately capture our discomfort when we reflect on troubling cases 
where free and responsible agents are, nevertheless, plainly entangled 
in circumstances of fate and luck. Given all this, we must reject EP and 
accept that free will pessimism is the truth about the human 
predicament in respect of these matters.
Granted that we should reject EP and accept free will pessimism, there 
is no principled basis for rejecting critical compatibilism (contrary to 
BEA). That is to say, the fact that compatibilist conditions φ* fail EP, and 
do not satisfy the assumptions and aspiration it embodies, is not, in 
itself, an acceptable basis for rejecting these conditions. The 
conditions φ* proposed may, of course, be judged more or less adequate 
in terms of their descriptive accuracy and ability to account for the 
range of distinctions we need to make in this sphere but there is no 
basis for rejecting them altogether simply on the ground that they fail 
EP. While critical compatibilism certainly requires some (plausible) 
interpretation of conditions φ*—and this remains a contested matter 
among them—the relevant standard for this assessment is not that it 
both respects and satisfies EP.36
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V. The Free Will Problem and Free Will Pessimism
We are now in a position to assess what significance the conclusion of 
FWPA (i.e., that we should reject EP and accept free will pessimism) 
has for the free will problem itself. There are two ways of interpreting 
the free will problem, one that is broad and general in character and 
another that is narrower and more specific. We may present the free 
will problem in the broad and general manner as being concerned with 
the question concerning the nature and conditions of freedom and 
moral responsibility. Plainly, however, viewing the problem in this more 
open-ended fashion does not serve to capture the more specific 
features of the free will problem and the standards of solution that have 
been set for it. As has been explained, throughout most of the modern 
period, the parties to this debate have enjoyed a shared understanding 
of the background assumptions and aspirations that frame this problem 
and what they would accept as an adequate solution for it. They are 
agreed, more specifically, that EP, as associated with the assumptions 
and (optimistic) aspirations of the morality system, is essential to the 
structure of this problem and that it serves as the relevant standard for 
any acceptable solution that may be proposed. In this way, the solution 
that all the parties to the free will problem have sought and struggled 
to find is to provide an account of conditions of freedom and 
responsibility that satisfies EP.37 Even skepticism, which denies that 
any such account can be provided, accepts that this is the relevant 
problem that stands in need of a solution and that EP must be 
respected even if it cannot be satisfied. For the skeptic this remains the 
relevant requirement for any adequate theory of freedom and moral 
responsibility and the problem of free will must be interpreted in these 
terms. To dispense with EP, therefore, is not to propose an alternative 
solution to the free will problem, so conceived, but rather to reject the 
problem altogether—along with its grounding and motivating 
assumptions and aspirations. These are, however, the very steps that 
FWPA takes and, therefore, free will pessimism should not be 
understood or interpreted as any kind of solution to the free will 
problem (i.e., given this stricter, narrower interpretation).
On the narrow understanding of the free will problem, all the parties 
involved in this dispute are agreed that free will pessimism cannot even 
be considered an available candidate for a solution, since it depends on 
rejecting the very assumptions that generate the problem in the first 
place—namely, EP. Considered from this perspective, the correct 
understanding of critical compatibilism is that it aims to replace the 
free will problem with an acceptance of free will pessimism, understood 
as a more truthful account of the human predicament. This 
predicament, along with its distinct pessimistic implications, is not a 
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problem to be solved but a predicament waiting to be recognized and 
acknowledged. Taking this step involves abandoning the evasions and 
fabrications of the morality system and the various modes of theorizing 
associated with it. When we abandon these assumptions and 
aspirations of the morality system, we do not solve the free will 
problem so much as cast it aside.
What, then, does free will pessimism contribute to the free will problem 
more broadly conceived? Even if we discard EP, and reject the free will 
problem as narrowly interpreted, we still cannot present free will 
pessimism as a solution to the free will problem more broadly 
conceived. Any solution along these lines would require a complete and 
convincing account of conditions φ*. Although we may be fully 
persuaded by FWPA, we still face any number of significant issues and 
difficulties relating to the (contested) interpretation of conditions φ*. 
While the narrow free will problem should be cast aside, and we can 
agree that accounts of conditions φ* cannot and should not be rejected 
on the ground that they fail the standard of EP, critical compatibilism 
must still develop and defend its own preferred interpretation of 
conditions φ*. Clearly, then, a defense of free will pessimism does not, 
by itself, provide us with a complete theory of critical compatibilism. 
Many suggested accounts of conditions φ* may be found 
wanting and should be discarded. Even the most promising may still 
require further refinement or better articulation.38
Having identified the limits of FWPA, we may now summarize its key 
claims and contributions. There are three interconnected components 
to this argument that are especially significant. First, the FWPA 
provides a diagnosis of why (orthodox) compatibilists have resisted the 
critical compatibilist approach and the free will pessimism associated 
with it. The fundamental source of resistance, it is argued, has its roots 
in the assumptions and aspirations of the morality system. Second, the 
FWPA makes clear that any adequate solution to the free will problem 
broadly conceived, as provided by some satisfactory account of 
conditions φ*, will not deliver wholly optimistic conclusions about our 
human predicament in respect of these matters. On the contrary, free 
will pessimism is the troubling and difficult truth about our 
predicament and any credible account of conditions φ* must recognize 
and acknowledge this. Third, and most importantly, the FWPA makes 
clear that any adequate and acceptable solution to the free will 
problem, broadly conceived, does not and cannot turn on a solution to 
the free will problem narrowly interpreted in terms of EP. The free will 
problem, more narrowly understood, has been generated by the faulty 
assumptions and illusory aspirations of the morality system. When 
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these assumptions and aspirations are set aside we are better placed to 
recognize and acknowledge the (difficult) truth about the human 
predicament, without the evasions and fabrications that are 
encouraged by the morality system.39
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are free and responsible agents. See Smilansky (2000). Similarly, 
philosophical resistance to the skeptical conclusion is often motivated 
by the thought that this would be a “painful conclusion to 
accept” (Taylor 1959).
(7) Nagel (1976: 32–3).
(8) Dennett (1984: Ch. 4).
(9) Nagel (1976: 39).
(10) Nagel (1976: 40).
(11) Dennett (1984: 104–5, 129).
(12) Russell (2002: 233–42), and also Russell (2000).
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(13) Whether we attach the label of “fate” to this concern is merely a 
verbal matter—the substantial concern or issue remains with us.
(14) Dennett (1984: 94).
(15) Nagel (1976: 38).
(16) Williams (1985ā: Ch. 10).
(17) Williams (1985ā: 217): “The purity of morality itself represents a 
value. …”
(18) Wallace (1994: 39–40, 64–6).
(19) Wallace (1994: 39–40, 64–5), Galen Strawson (1994: 366).
(20) Dennett (1984): “… my conclusion is optimistic: free will is not an 
illusion, not even an irrepressible and life-enhancing illusion” (169). For 
criticism and doubts about Dennett’s optimism see Russell (2002: 249–
51).
(21) This is a prominent theme in many optimistic skeptical views about 
moral responsibility. See, for example, Pereboom (2001, 2007), and also 
Waller (2011).
(22) See, for example, Williams’ observation that “skepticism about the 
freedom of morality from luck cannot leave the concept of morality 
where it was …” (1976: 39). See also Williams (1985ā: 53, 170, 1985b: 
19–20, and esp. 1993: 126, 158–67).
(23) Williams (1985ā: 43, 73, 215–17). Related to this, Williams also 
emphasizes the way in which the morality system places particular 
emphasis on the importance of voluntariness and blame in this context.
(24) In relation to this see Russell (2008). See also P. F. Strawson’s 
remarks noting that inside the web of reactive attitudes and feelings 
“there is endless room for modification, redirection, criticism, and 
justification” (1962: 81).
(25) One such troubling case that helps to illuminate free will 
pessimism, and highlights the way in which it contrasts with theories 
constructed around the demands of EP, is that of “Robert Harris” (who 
is discussed in some detail in Watson (1987)).
(26) My discussion of libertarianism in this section (relating to premises 
#8 and #9) has been compressed but a more detailed account is 
presented in an extended version of this paper in Russell (2017).
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(27) Taylor (1959: 310).
(28) Chisholm (1964: 34).
(29) Kane (2007: 23, 27). See also Strawson (1962: 83), who famously 
describes libertarianism of this general kind as relying on “obscure and 
panicky metaphysics.”
(30) Kane (1996). The soft/hard distinction in relation to both 
libertarianism and compatibilism is presented in Watson (1999).
(31) See, for example, Pereboom (2001: 50–4) and Pereboom (2007: 
103–10) for a clear statement of this general line of criticism to event-
causal theories.
(32) Wallace (1994: 54–6).
(33) Wallace (1994: 39–40, 64–6). For criticism of Wallace’s “narrow” 
interpretation of responsibility as framed in terms of the apparatus of 
“the morality system” see Russell (2013).
(34) See, for example, Strawson (1994), which was originally published 
as “The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility” but subsequently 
published under the more restricted title “The Impossibility of Ultimate
Moral Responsibility” (my emphasis). The insertion of “ultimate” marks 
a drift from global to local skepticism and, therefore, a considerable 
shift in the significance and scope of the conclusion that is being drawn 
from his “basic [skeptical] argument”. A similar slide or ambiguity can, 
perhaps, also be detected in Pereboom’s contributions, where he 
discusses “analogues” of the reactive attitudes that survive the 
skeptical critique that he advances (2001: 97, 199–200, 2007: 118–20). 
(See also n. 35.)
(35) It may be argued that Pereboom’s “hard incompatibilism” is liable 
to this line of criticism since, on the face of it, hard incompatibilism 
may be read as a combination of global skepticism and optimism. There 
is, however, an alternative, weaker reading that presents hard 
incompatibilism as only locally skeptical about “basic desert” views of 
freedom and responsibility (i.e., of the kind encouraged by the morality 
system), while still rejecting global skepticism of any kind. On the 
weaker reading both hard compatibilism and critical compatibilism may 
well converge and be able to accommodate each other in these 
important respects (i.e., since they are both locally skeptical but also 
reject global skepticism). Nevertheless, from the perspective of critical 
compatibilism, the crucial point is that rejecting the morality system 
and its particular interpretation of freedom and moral responsibility 
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does not leave us in a wholly comfortable situation that licenses 
complacency or optimism. On the contrary, when we abandon EP, we 
must accept free will pessimism and acknowledge the troubling 
predicament associated with it.
(36) Critical compatibilism, so described, might be viewed as simply a 
version of “revisionist” theory of freedom and responsibility, for 
example Vargas (2007, 2013). There are, however, a number of reasons 
for resisting this suggestion, including the fact that some orthodox
compatibilist theories also present themselves as “revisionary” (see, for 
example, Dennett 1984: 19). In general, what matters for a proper 
assessment of any proposed revisionary theory, as it concerns critical 
compatibilism, is, first, where it stands in relation to EP and, second, 
what stance it takes with respect to the metaphysical attitudes 
involved. A “revisionary” theory may or may not reject EP and, even if it 
does, it may or may not endorse the particular pessimistic attitudes 
that are drawn from this by way of free will pessimism (as some 
theorists may regard dispensing with EP as entirely untroubling, if not 
liberating). Suffice it to note that most contemporary revisionist 
projects follow in the neo-Skinnerian tracks of Dennett’s optimistic 
pragmatism.
(37) As we have noted, this includes (orthodox) compatibilists, such as 
Wallace (1994: 64–6).
(38) For two important and impressive recent contributions that offer 
(compatibilist-friendly) accounts of moral responsibility see McKenna 
(2012) and Shoemaker (2015).
(39) This paper has gone through multiple drafts and has been 
presented to a number of different audiences over a period of several 
years. This includes presentations at Leiden (2009), Budapest/CEU 
(2009), Oxford (2010), Arizona (2012), Delaware (2013), Montreal 
(2014), Chicago (2014), Aarhus/Danish Philosophical Association 
(2015), Gothenburg (2015), and NOWAR (2015). I am grateful to many 
individuals who were present on those occasions for their valuable 
comments and criticisms. Although I am not able to thank them all, I 
am especially grateful to John Fischer, Michael McKenna, Derk 
Pereboom, Jesse Prinz, Saul Smilansky, Galen Strawson, and Daniel 
Telech.
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